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Abstract 
Using the adoption of SFAS 142 as an exogenous shock, we examine the effect of changes in 
financial reporting on firms’ internal information environment. SFAS 142 removed goodwill 
amortization and required firms to perform a two-step impairment test. We argue that 
complying with SFAS 142 induces managers to acquire new information and, therefore, 
improves managers’ information sets. Interviews with executives and auditors confirm this 
argument. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that firms affected by SFAS 142 
(i.e., treatment firms) experience an improvement in management forecast accuracy in the 
post-SFAS 142 period compared with those not affected. The increase is smaller for 
treatment firms with stronger monitoring mechanisms in the pre-SFAS 142 period and greater 
for firms with a higher likelihood of goodwill impairment. We further find that treatment 
firms with improvements in management forecast accuracy have higher M&A quality, 
internal capital allocation efficiency, and performance in the post-SFAS142 period than other 
treatment firms. Overall, our findings indicate that changes in external financial reporting can 
lead to better corporate decisions via their impact on the internal information environment.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the effect of changes in firms’ external financial reporting on 
their internal information environment. Several recent studies suggest that changes in 
financial reporting improve firms’ investment and capital allocation decisions (e.g., Graham, 
Hanlon, and Shevlin 2011; Cho 2015; Shroff 2017). Prior research provides two non-
exclusive arguments for how changes in financial reporting affect firms’ corporate decisions. 
The first argument is based on agency costs: improved external financial reporting can reduce 
the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and thereby agency costs, 
leading to better corporate decisions (i.e., the agency cost hypothesis). The second argument 
is based on the change in the internal information environment (e.g., Shroff 2017): due to 
changes in external reporting, managers must collect more information in order to comply 
with the new standards. Through this process, managers likely obtain new information and 
such new information helps them to make better and more informed corporate decisions (i.e., 
the information hypothesis). While prior research has provided direct evidence on the agency 
cost hypothesis (e.g., Berger and Hann 2003, 2007; Hope and Thomas 2008; Cho 2015), 
there is little direct evidence on the second argument. The purpose of our study is to provide 
direct evidence on the information hypothesis.  
Based on prior research and in-depth interviews with executives and auditors, we argue 
that the introduction of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 142, 
Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
can improve firms’ internal information environment. Effective with fiscal years beginning 
after December 15, 2001, the adoption of this standard changed the accounting for goodwill 
dramatically. Prior to SFAS 142, accounting for goodwill was governed by APB 17 and 
SFAS 121. APB 17 required the amortization of goodwill over its useful life and later SFAS 
121 provided guidelines for the impairment of long-lived assets, including goodwill. Under 
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these standards, goodwill was reviewed for impairment with its related assets when changes 
in circumstances indicated that the carrying amount may not be recoverable, but the test was 
not conducted on a regular basis. In contrast, SFAS 142 removed goodwill amortization and 
required firms to perform a two-step impairment test at least annually. In step one, the firm 
determines whether the fair value of the reporting unit in which the goodwill resides is lower 
than its current book value. If so, the firm proceeds to step two to compare the unit’s recorded 
goodwill to the implied goodwill (i.e., the excess of the unit’s fair value over its net assets 
excluding goodwill). If the recorded goodwill is higher, the firm records an impairment loss.  
Unlike other settings where information was available to managers but not required for 
disclosure before the new standard became effective (e.g., SFAS 131 on segment reporting), 
managers do not necessarily have the information about the fair value of the reporting units 
before the adoption of SFAS 142. Consistent with this conjecture, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many firms did not know the fair value of their identifiable intangible assets 
before SFAS 142, and, afterwards, they relied on external experts (e.g., valuation consultants) 
to perform the valuation test on an ongoing basis due to the scope and complexity of the new 
standard (e.g., Reason 2003). After the adoption of SFAS 142, managers are also likely to 
spend more time and effort in obtaining additional information about the general economic 
and business conditions of operating units that is useful for forecasting sales and updating 
other inputs of the forecasting models, all of which will improve the managers’ information 
sets. As such, the adoption of SFAS 142 is an ideal setting to study how a change in external 
reporting affects the internal information environment. 
We use a difference-in-differences research design to isolate the effect of SFAS 142. 
The treatment group consists of firms that report goodwill throughout our sample period. The 
control group consists of firms that never report goodwill during the same time period and, 
therefore, are not affected by the SFAS 142 adoption. Following prior studies (Dorantes et al. 
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2013; Gallemore and Labro 2014; Goodman et al. 2014), we use management earnings 
forecast accuracy to capture the quality of managers’ information sets. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find that compared with control firms, treatment firms provide more accurate 
earnings forecasts in the post-SFAS 142 period than in the pre-SFAS 142 period. This finding 
indicates that the annual assessment of the fair value of reporting units required under SFAS 
142 induces managers to collect new information about the reporting units, thereby allowing 
them to make better forecasts of the firm’s future performance.  
Additional analyses indicate that this result is robust to alternative research designs. 
First, we use a propensity score matching approach to identify a set of control firms based on 
firm characteristics and obtain similar inferences. Second, we restrict our sample to treatment 
firms and find that the treatment firms with a larger goodwill balance experience a greater 
improvement in forecast accuracy than other treatment firms. If managers of these firms have 
to spend more time in valuing the reporting units, the uncovered information is likely to be 
more important in forming their earnings forecasts. These alternative designs are less subject 
to the concern that treatment and control firms differ fundamentally and might be affected 
differently by contemporaneous events, but the tradeoff is that the sample size is smaller, 
likely reducing the generalizability of the results. 
We then conduct a series of cross-sectional analyses to reinforce the inferences. First, 
we investigate how the result varies with the effectiveness of firms’ monitoring mechanisms. 
Prior research finds that firms with higher board independence are less likely to engage in 
financial frauds and are more likely to provide frequent and accurate earnings forecasts, 
consistent with boards of directors performing a monitoring role in reviewing the firm’s 
information acquisition effort and disclosure policy (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; 
Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005). The interviewed executives and auditors also 
commented that firms conduct goodwill impairment tests more carefully when corporate 
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governance is strong; while this comment is made under the current accounting regime, it is 
conceivable that it applies to goodwill impairment tests under the former accounting regime. 
As such, we expect the adoption of SFAS 142 to have a smaller impact on firms with strong 
monitoring mechanisms in the pre-SFAS 142 period. Consistent with our predictions, we find 
that compared with other treatment firms, the treatment firms with higher board 
independence, higher market value, and stronger governance and monitoring in the pre-SFAS 
142 period experience a smaller increase in management forecast accuracy.  
Second, if managers expect the likelihood of goodwill impairment to be higher, they 
will be more diligent in collecting information and conducting the impairment test, leading to 
a bigger improvement in the internal information environment. Consistent with this 
conjecture, we find that the results are more pronounced for the treatment firms that 
experience a severe decline in the market-to-book ratio, face stronger competition, as 
captured by managers’ references to competition in 10-K filings, and have a higher estimated 
probability of goodwill impairment. Overall, the cross-sectional evidence increases our 
confidence in attributing the main findings to the adoption of SFAS 142. 
We conduct several additional analyses to further triangulate our main inferences and to 
provide new insights. First, we find that investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by 
treatment firms in the post-SFAS 142 period, compared with control firms. This result is 
consistent with investors perceiving these forecasts to be more accurate and informative. 
Second, if an improvement in internal information environment allows managers to integrate 
new information into financial reporting systems in a timelier manner, conducting goodwill 
impairment tests should reduce the preparation time between the fiscal-period end and the 
earnings announcement date. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the speed in which 
earnings are announced improves for treatment firms in the post-SFAS 142 period.  
Third, we conduct two falsification tests to strengthen our inferences. SFAS 142 
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changed the accounting for goodwill, but not for other intangible assets with finite lives. 
Thus, we should not find the same results for the firms with other intangibles. Indeed, we find 
that firms reporting other intangibles with finite lives throughout the sample period do not 
experience any changes in forecast accuracy, compared with those that do not report other 
intangibles. We also choose a pseudo-event year and do not find a difference in forecast 
accuracy between the pseudo-pre and pseudo-post periods. These results indicate that our 
findings are not attributable to contemporaneous events, the trend in M&A activities over 
time, or the fundamental heterogeneity between treatment and control firms.  
Fourth, we rule out the possibility that our results are driven by contemporaneous 
regulatory changes (e.g., the SOX Act) by excluding firms with disclosed internal control 
material weaknesses and by controlling for the change in board independence.  
An alternative explanation for our results is that managers of treatment firms are better 
able to manage earnings to meet their own forecasts. However, inconsistent with this 
alternative explanation, we find that treatment firms are not more likely to engage in earnings 
management in the post-SFAS 142 period than in the pre-SFAS 142 period, compared with 
control firms.    
Lastly, if the improved internal information environment enables managers to make 
better corporate decisions, then we should observe that treatment firms with a larger 
improvement in forecast accuracy make better M&A and internal capital allocation decisions, 
ultimately leading to superior performance than other treatment firms. Consistent with this 
prediction, we find that treatment firms with a larger improvement in forecast accuracy 
exhibit higher M&A announcement returns (a proxy for M&A quality), internal capital 
allocation efficiency, and return-on-assets in the post-SFAS 142 period than other treatment 
firms. These results suggest that financial reporting changes can improve corporate decisions 
and performance via their impact on firms’ internal information environment. 
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While our findings suggest that the information managers obtain from complying with 
SFAS 142 is helpful, there are a few reasons why not all managers of treatment firms collect 
such information prior to the adoption of SFAS 142. First, it is costly to estimate the fair 
value of goodwill and it is uncertain whether the collected information is beneficial. Indeed, 
Holtzman and Sinnett (2009) find that approximately 80% of firms indicated that the board 
and top management were somewhat or heavily involved in the process. Such involvement by 
senior executives is costly because it requires time and effort, distracting them from other 
important operational activities. Second, managers, who are not always rational, might not be 
aware of these benefits ex ante. Consistent with this notion, prior studies suggest managers 
exhibit cognitive biases that can lead them to make suboptimal decisions (Malmendier and 
Tate 2008). Third, managers might deliberately choose not to obtain the fair value estimate of 
the reporting units with goodwill, because doing so might reveal the potentially poor quality 
of their past M&A decisions, which might result from managerial overconfidence, agency 
costs (e.g., empire building), or unintentional mistakes. Failing to collect useful information 
is a manifestation of agency problems and such tendency should be higher when firms have 
weaker governance mechanisms. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with 
weaker governance mechanisms in the pre-SFAS 142 period (e.g., lower board 
independence) experience a larger improvement in their forecast accuracy. 
Our study contributes to the recent stream of literature on the consequences of financial 
reporting by shedding light on the underlying mechanisms (e.g., Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal 2005; Hope and Thomas 2008; Graham et al. 2011; Cho 2015; Shroff 2017). 
Specifically, we extend this line of research by documenting that a change in financial 
reporting requirements can induce managers to collect more information and improve firms’ 
internal information environment. Moreover, our findings indicate that a change in external 
reporting can improve managers’ corporate decisions not only by reducing the information 
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asymmetry between managers and outside stakeholders and thereby agency costs, as 
established in prior literature (e.g., Berger and Hann 2003, 2007), but also by increasing the 
information internally available to managers.1   
Our study is related to Shroff (2017) and Goodman et al. (2014). Shroff (2017) argues 
that time constraints and information processing costs can prohibit managers from using all 
firm-relevant information in their decisions. Consistent with the prediction, he documents a 
positive association between firms’ investment decisions and the changes in GAAP that 
likely affect managers’ information sets. Goodman et al. (2014) find a positive association 
between managerial forecast accuracy and investment efficiency and argue that managers’ 
ability in forecasting improves both forecast accuracy and investment decisions. Our paper is 
different from these studies on two important dimensions. First, we extend these two studies 
by providing causal evidence on the effect of a change in external financial reporting on the 
internal information environment. While Shroff (2017) argues that the information hypothesis 
is the underlying link between the change in financial reporting and investment efficiency, he 
does not provide direct evidence on this issue. Similarly, Goodman et al. (2014) do not study 
the impact of changes in financial reporting on firms’ internal information environment. 
Second, extending these two studies, we demonstrate that a change in external reporting can 
improve managers’ information sets, which in turn leads to better corporate decisions. 
Our study also contributes to the line of literature on the consequences of SFAS 142 
adoption. To date, this body of research has primarily focused on managers’ discretionary 
timing of goodwill impairment and investors’ responses to impairment charges (e.g., Hayn 
and Hughes 2006; Ramanna 2008; Zang 2008; Li and Sloan 2017; Ramanna and Watts 2012; 
Chen et al. 2013). Collectively, these studies suggest that managers delay the recognition of 
                                                 
1 Prior studies find that firms with high financial reporting quality have better investment efficiency (Biddle and 
Hilary 2006; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009). These studies usually attribute the 
finding to the notion that high financial reporting quality reduces both moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. 
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goodwill impairment charges and that investors do not see through firms’ overstated goodwill 
balances.2 An exception is Li et al. (2011), which finds that goodwill impairment losses can 
predict firms’ future performance.  
We extend this stream of research by documenting an unintended consequence of SFAS 
142 adoption: its effect on firms’ internal information environment and investment decisions. 
This finding should be of interest to regulators, practitioners, and researchers, as the merits of 
SFAS 142 and the move toward fair value accounting are still under considerable debate.3 
Our study speaks to a benefit of the goodwill impairment tests. 
Note that while our findings are based on an analysis of SFAS 142, the results can 
potentially be generalized to other instances where firms are required to acquire additional 
information to comply with a new accounting standard. We focus on SFAS 142 because it 
likely provides us with the strongest setting to test the information hypothesis. The other 
accounting standard changes that also require managers to collect information only affect 
certain industries (e.g., SFAS 143: Accounting for Asset Retirement Obligations) or specific 
accounts (e.g., SFAS 112: Accounting for Post-retirement Benefits).4 In contrast, SFAS 142 
affects all firms with goodwill.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the 
institutional background on goodwill accounting and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the sample selection and variable definitions. Sections 4 reports the empirical 
results on the effect of SFAS 142 on management forecast accuracy and Section 5 on 
additional analyses. Section 6 reports the effect of SFAS 142 on M&A quality, internal 
                                                 
2 We argue that managers obtain new information during the goodwill impairment tests. Whether that 
information is provided in financial reporting in a timely fashion is a separate issue. Thus, our finding that firms 
experience an improvement in their internal information environment in the post-SFAS 142 period does not 
contradict firms’ incentives to delay impairment charges.  
3 Please see http://www.mfa-cpa.com/Blog/2014/03/Public-Companies-and-Goodwill-Back-to-the-Future. 
4 SFAS 143 requires the recognition of the fair value of Asset Retirement Obligation liabilities for tangible long-
lived assets. Guinn et al. (2005) find that only 10% of U.S. public companies are affected by this standard and 
that, among the companies affected, the reported changes in their financial statements were relatively minor.  
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capital allocation efficiency, and firm performance via its impact on the internal information 
environment. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Institutional background and the main hypothesis 
In this section, we describe the institutional background related to goodwill impairment 
and develop our main hypotheses based on the accounting standards and prior research. To 
better understand the impact of SFAS 142 and the differences in managers’ and auditors’ 
approaches to goodwill accounting under different reporting regimes, we interviewed seven 
executives,5 including two Chief Financial Officers (one from a financial firm and the other 
from a non-financial firm), and four auditors at two Big4 accounting firms. These executives 
handle goodwill impairment tests for their respective companies. Similarly, the auditors we 
interviewed, two of which are partners, have vast experience working with their clients on 
goodwill impairment tests. The Internet Appendix provides a detailed summary of the 
insights obtained from the interviews; we incorporate the key points to the discussion below 
whenever appropriate.  
Prior to the introduction of SFAS 142, APB Opinion 17 and SFAS 121 addressed how 
goodwill and other intangible assets should be accounted for. APB Opinion 17 viewed 
goodwill as an asset with a finite life and directed it to “be amortized by systematic charges 
to income over the period estimated to be benefited. The period of amortization should not, 
however, exceed forty years (AICPA 1970, para. 9).” Complementing APB Opinion 17, 
SFAS 121 governed accounting for the impairment of long-lived assets, certain identifiable 
intangibles, and goodwill related to those assets. Under SFAS 121, firms should review long-
                                                 
5 The majority of these executives are from financial industries and the sample firms are from non-financial 
industries. Thus, one caveat is that the insights obtained from interviews might not apply to firms in non-
financial industries. 
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lived assets and certain identifiable intangibles for impairment “whenever events or changes 
in circumstances indicate that the carrying amount of an asset may not be recoverable (FASB 
1995, para.4).” Under SFAS 121, goodwill was reviewed together with the related assets (i.e., 
those acquired in the same transaction that creates goodwill) if the related assets were tested 
for recoverability. Under SFAS 121, an asset was considered unrecoverable if its carrying 
value was higher than the sum of expected future cash flows (not the discounted value). An 
impairment loss was calculated as the amount by which the carrying amount of the asset 
exceeded the fair value of the asset.  
The introduction of SFAS 142 dramatically changed the accounting for goodwill. It 
removes goodwill amortization and requires firms to perform a two-step impairment test at 
least annually, as discussed above. SFAS 142 differs from APB Opinion 17 and SFAS 121 in 
several important ways and, due to these differences, the adoption of SFAS 142 can enhance 
firms’ internal information environment. First, compared with the amortization of goodwill 
under APB Opinion 17 and the discretion managers had with respect to impairment tests 
under SFAS 121, the mandatory requirement of fair-valuing assets and liabilities at the 
reporting unit level under SFAS 142 implies much more involvement by management 
(Holtzman and Sinnett 2009). To obtain a reasonable estimate of the fair value, firms need to 
estimate the expected future cash flows generated from the assets and the risks associated 
with those cash flows.6 Cash flow projections are based on managers’ estimates of revenue 
growth rates and operating margins, taking into account industry and market conditions. The 
discount rate is generally a weighted-average cost of capital adjusted for business-specific 
and region-specific risk characteristics.7  
                                                 
6 Comiskey and Mulford (2010) review 10K filings of a sample of U.S. firms and find that the most frequently 
used methods in estimating the fair value of the reporting units are the present value of future cash flows and 
market multiples, or a weighted average of the two.  
7 For example, when describing the approach for the impairment test, HP states in its 2012 annual report that 
“HP calculates the fair value of a reporting unit based on the present value of estimated future cash flows. Cash 
flow projections are based on management’s estimates of revenue growth rates and operating margins, taking 
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As one of the auditors we interviewed pointed out, many firms often do not have the 
resources, skill sets, or knowledge to provide a robust discounted cash flow as required by 
SFAS 142 for the goodwill impairment test. Due to the vast amount of information required 
to perform this task, 57% of surveyed CFOs indicated that with the adoption of SFAS 142, 
their firms are likely to use outside assistance for valuation purposes, and 71% said they 
would seek outside help when performing the impairment test (Lewis, Lippitt, and 
Mastracchio 2001).8 In addition, outside consultants can provide managers with more in-
depth information based on comparisons with their competitors and other firms in the same 
industry. All these discussions suggest that firms conduct goodwill impairment tests more 
rigorously under SFAS 142 than under SFAS 121. 
Second, while companies were required to conduct goodwill impairment tests under 
SFAS 121, there was not enough guidance, reducing the effectiveness of such tests (Huefner 
and Largay 2004). For example, FASB states on page 6 of SFAS 142 that “Previous 
standards provided little guidance about how to determine and measure goodwill impairment; 
as a result, the accounting for goodwill impairments was not consistent and not comparable 
and yielded information of questionable usefulness. This Statement provides specific 
guidance for testing goodwill for impairment.” In addition, because goodwill is no longer 
amortized, the likelihood of goodwill impairment is higher under SFAS 142 than under SFAS 
121. This implies that firms have to conduct goodwill impairment tests more rigorously under 
SFAS 142 than under SFAS 121. For example, as one of the interviewed audit firm partner 
commented, “Because firms no longer amortize, the risk of impairment is higher and the 
magnitude is also likely to be higher now. As a result, the conversation with our clients has 
                                                 
into consideration industry and market conditions. The discount rate used is based on the weighted-average cost 
of capital adjusted for the relevant risk associated with business-specific characteristics and the uncertainty 
related to the business’s ability to execute on the projected cash flows.” 
8 These data are based on managers’ responses to the initial adoption of SFAS 142. Reason (2003) argues that 
the demand for valuation consultants is expected to continue after the initial adoption year. These discussions 
imply an increase in the reliance on external valuation consultants after the adoption of SFAS 142. 
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changed.” The interviewed executives also commented that they undertake goodwill 
impairment tests much more carefully and rigorously now than under SFAS 121 because of 
the pressure from auditors. As one interviewed executive pointed out, “Anything the auditors 
challenged or raised, we will have to make sure that we are comfortable with whatever we are 
doing. We have to address that point properly. So if they raised certain concerns, then we will 
have to go back to the team who prepares it, and try to understand, fit in or provide the 
comment back, and see how we can actually make it better or more accurate.” 
Third, while SFAS 121 required firms to review their assets for potential impairment, 
firms were not required to conduct the recoverability test on a regular basis (e.g., Riedl 2004; 
Chen, Kohlbeck, and Warfield 2008). In contrast, under SFAS 142, goodwill needs to be 
tested for impairment at least annually, and such tests must be performed on an interim basis 
if “an event occurs or circumstances change that would more likely than not reduce the fair 
value of a reporting unit below its carrying amount (FASB 2001, para. 28).” For example, 
one of the interviewed executives indicated that while careful and rigorous impairment tests 
are conducted toward the end of each year, the company also conducts goodwill impairment 
tests quarterly under the current practice, especially if there are any adverse changes to their 
internal forecasts. Consistent with this, Holtzman and Sinnett (2009) find that of the firms 
that recorded an impairment charge, 79% indicated that the impairment was taken due to an 
interim goodwill impairment test.  
Overall, compared to SFAS 121, SFAS 142 is very specific about the timing, testing 
level, and amount of goodwill impairment. To estimate the fair value of the reporting unit, 
managers must collect relevant information to determine the appropriate revenue growth rate, 
operating margins, and discount factor. Since this information affects the strategic planning 
of the reporting unit, it will lead to revised inputs in the firm’s long-term growth and short-
term budget outlook, both of which are likely to be reflected in the firm’s earnings forecasts. 
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For example, in the 2012 annual report, HP states that “in conjunction with HP’s annual 
goodwill impairment testing, HP identified certain indicators of impairment. The indicators 
of impairment included lower than expected revenue and profitability levels over a sustained 
period of time, the trading values of HP stock and downward revisions to management’s 
short-term and long-term forecast …, and the timing of this forecast revision coincided with 
the timing of HP’s overall forecasting process for all reporting units (page 107).” 
Hemmer and Labro (2008) model the relation between firms’ internal accounting 
systems and their external financial reports. They show in their proposition 6 that a change in 
financial reporting towards standards that reveal more information about firm valuation and 
less information about managers’ effort (e.g., fair-value oriented standards such as SFAS 
142) can lead to improved profitability because the agent will endogenously choose the 
optimal managerial accounting system. Their model implies that firms affected by SFAS 142 
will invest more time, effort, and resources to comply with the new standards, resulting in an 
improved internal information environment.  
Overall, these discussions indicate that the adoption of SFAS 142 can improve 
managers’ information sets for firms that are affected by SFAS 142 adoption. Note that both 
our argument and the insights obtained from the interviews suggest that the benefit from 
goodwill impairment tests is not conditional on the ex post occurrence of goodwill 
impairment. That is, our argument applies to all firms with goodwill, and therefore the 
treatment firms include all firms with goodwill. Firms without goodwill, referred to as control 
firms, are not affected by the adoption of SFAS 142 and should not experience any change in 
their internal information environment. Following prior research, we use management 
forecast accuracy to infer a firm’s internal information quality.9 As such, our first hypothesis 
                                                 
9 Previous studies have used management forecast accuracy to capture the quality of managers’ information sets 
in other settings, such as internal control (Feng, Li, and McVay 2009), enterprise systems implementation 
(Dorantes et al. 2013), capital investments (Goodman et al. 2014), and tax avoidance (Gallemore and Labro 
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(in alternative form) is: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, treatment firms experience an improvement in management 
forecast accuracy following the adoption of SFAS 142, compared with control 
firms. 
 
2.2 Cross-sectional variation 
The effect of SFAS 142 on management forecast accuracy is likely to vary across firms. 
The main argument for H1 focuses on the differences in the implementation of goodwill 
impairment tests between SFAS 142 and the previous standards. Based on these differences, 
we expect treatment firms to conduct goodwill impairment tests more carefully and 
rigorously and spend more time on the tests in the post-SFAS 142 period. It thus follows that 
the effect of SFAS 142 adoption on forecast accuracy improvement likely varies with (1) how 
carefully and rigorously the treatment firms conduct impairment tests in the pre-SFAS 142 
period and (2) how much effort the treatment firms expend on the impairment tests in the 
post-SFAS 142 period. Accordingly, we conduct two cross-sectional analysis, one based on 
the variation in firms’ monitoring mechanisms in the pre-SFAS 142 period that can affect the 
rigor of goodwill impairment tests, and the other based on the variation in the effort of 
conducting goodwill impairment tests in the post-SFAS 142 period as captured by the 
likelihood of goodwill impairment. 
First, H1 is based on the notion that firms collect valuable information in conducting 
goodwill impairment tests. Given the value of the collected information, firms with stronger 
corporate governance likely already spend more time and effort collecting information when 
conducting goodwill impairment tests in the pre-SFAS 142 period.10 If this is the case, the 
                                                 
2014). Ittner and Michels (2017) validate the use of management forecasts as a proxy for firms’ internal 
information based on survey responses to firms’ risk-based forecasting and planning processes.  
10 This argument is consistent with the findings in prior research on the effect of corporate governance on 
corporate disclosure. For example, Beasley (1996), Dechow et al. (1996), and Klein (2002) find that corporate 
governance characteristics are positively associated with financial reporting quality. Further, Ajinkya et al. 
(2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that firms with greater board independence provide forecasts 
with higher quality. 
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incremental effect of SFAS 142 adoption on internal information environment quality is 
likely to be smaller for these firms. The importance of governance in goodwill impairment 
tests is emphasized by both the interviewed executives and audit firm partners. For example, 
one interviewed executive commented that “We always emphasize [that] … the independent 
board has approved this [valuation].” When emphasizing the importance of governance, one 
interviewed audit partner commented that “there are other people in the organization [with 
whom] you can share your views, have those conversations. There’s always the board; there’s 
always the audit committee.”11  
Therefore, if firms with stronger monitoring mechanisms conduct goodwill impairment 
tests more rigorously in the pre-SFAS 142 period, then they should experience a smaller 
improvement in their internal information environment following the adoption of SFAS 142. 
This leads to our second hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H2: The positive association between the adoption of SFAS 142 and management 
forecast accuracy, as stated in H1, is less pronounced for treatment firms with 
stronger monitoring mechanisms in the pre-SFAS 142 period than for other 
treatment firms. 
 
Second, to the extent that managers can exercise some degree of discretion in applying 
accounting standards, the effect of SFAS 142 on the internal information environment likely 
varies with managers’ incentives to review the value of goodwill. Given the significant 
number of assumptions and estimates involved in the forecasts of future cash flows, growth 
rates, and discount rates, and the high degree of uncertainty these assumptions and estimates 
are subject to, firms with a high likelihood of goodwill impairment are likely to be more 
concerned about the applicability of the models to the firm’s assets and businesses. When 
managers expect an impending impairment of goodwill, they likely spend more time and 
                                                 
11 By the same token, firms with stronger governance in the post-SFAS 142 period implement SFAS 142 more 
rigorously and thus should experience a bigger improvement in management forecast accuracy. An untabulated 
analysis confirms this conjecture. Note that board independence is not very sticky during our sample period due 
to exchange and SOX requirements on majority board independence.  
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effort in collecting information, and auditors are also likely to be more diligent. Therefore, 
firms with a higher likelihood of goodwill impairment, that is, those close to the impairment 
threshold, have stronger incentives to exert effort to conduct the impairment test rigorously in 
the post-SFAS 142 period. Accordingly, the effect of SFAS 142 adoption on the internal 
information environment is likely to be greater for these firms. This leads us to our third 
hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H3: The positive association between the adoption of SFAS 142 and management 
forecast accuracy, as stated in H1, is more pronounced for treatment firms with a 
higher likelihood of goodwill impairment in the post-SFAS 142 period than for 
other treatment firms. 
 
3. Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Data and sample 
Given that SFAS 142 becomes effective for fiscal years starting after December 15, 
2001, the calendar year of the adoption (as in financial statement dates) is 2002 for 
December fiscal year-end firms, and 2003 for non-December fiscal year-end firms. To test 
the effect of SFAS 142, we focus on the three fiscal years before the adoption year (referred 
to as the pre-SFAS 142 period) and the three fiscal years after the adoption year (referred to 
as the post-SFAS 142 period).12 We do not include the year of adoption in the analyses to 
avoid the confounding effect of transition and uncertain timing of the impairment test (i.e., 
whether management forecasts are issued after the initial impairment test).  
To select our sample firms, we begin with the Compustat / CRSP merged dataset. The 
treatment group consists of firms that report goodwill in their financial statements throughout 
the six-year sample period, while the control group consists of firms that do not report any 
goodwill at any point in time during our sample period. Firms that report goodwill in some 
                                                 
12 The inferences are the same when we use a different measurement window for the pre- and post-SFAS 142 
periods (e.g., four or five years).  
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years in the sample period but not in other years are excluded from the sample to increase the 
power of our tests.13 We then merge this sample with management forecast data from First 
Call. We do not include earnings preannouncements because managers have little discretion 
in the issuance of these forecasts. To ensure that our results are not driven by the increasing 
coverage of First Call, we restrict our sample to firms that issue at least one earnings forecast 
in both the pre- and the post- SFAS 142 periods.14 Requiring firm-years to have data on 
forecast accuracy and other variables, our final sample consists of 2,511 firm-years.   
3.2 Regression model 
Given that treatment firms have goodwill and control firms do not, they are likely to 
differ from each other in certain firm characteristics. For example, because treatment firms 
engaged in acquisitions that created goodwill, they are likely to be larger and more 
diversified than control firms. To control for the effect of these differences and the potential 
time trends in forecast accuracy, we use a difference-in-differences design with firm fixed 
effects to isolate the effect of SFAS 142 on management forecast accuracy. In an untabulated 
analysis, we find that the treatment and control firms do not differ in time trends in forecast 
accuracy in the pre-SFAS 142 period, validating the parallel assumption underlying the 
difference-in-differences design.15 More specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
Forecast Accuracy = β0 + β1 Post142 + β2 Post142 × Treatment + β3 InstOwn + β4 AC 
+ β5 RetVol + β6 NumSeg+ β7 EqIss + β8 Log(AT) + β9 MTB +β10 
ROA + β11 Ret + β12 Loss + β13 Leverage + β14 CF + β15 Horizon 
+ Firm Dummies + e        (1) 
 
Forecast Accuracy is negative one times forecast error averaged across management 
forecasts for each firm-year. The forecast error of an individual forecast is calculated as the 
                                                 
13 In untabulated analyses, we find that our inferences remain the same when we include in our control group the 
54 firm-years that have goodwill in the pre-SFAS 142 period but no goodwill in the post-SFAS 142 period. 
14 Requiring the sample firms to issue at least one management forecast in each of the six years leads to the 
same inferences. 
15 In addition, our results hold after controlling for the time trend. Separately, adding the interaction terms of the 
Treatment variable with all the control variables leads to the same inferences; note that for this analysis, we 
replace firm fixed effects with industry fixed effects to avoid multicollinearity problems.  
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absolute value of the difference between the management earnings forecast and actual 
earnings, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.16 To ensure 
comparability between annual and quarterly forecasts, we multiply forecast error by four for 
quarterly forecasts, as in Cheng, Luo, and Yue (2013). Post142 is an indicator variable that 
equals one for the post-SFAS 142 period, and zero otherwise. Treatment is an indicator 
variable that equals one for treatment firms, and zero for control firms. Because we include 
firm dummies, we do not include the main effect of Treatment.17 The coefficient on Post142 
captures the change in forecast accuracy for control firms after the adoption of SFAS 142, 
and that on Post142 × Treatment captures the incremental change in forecast accuracy for 
treatment firms. H1 implies a positive coefficient on this interaction term. Throughout the 
paper, we adjust all standard errors for clustering at the two-digit SIC industry-year level and 
report one-sided p-values for variables with signed predictions, and two-sided otherwise. 
Following prior research, we include a comprehensive list of variables in Equation (1) 
to control for the effect of various firm and forecast characteristics on forecast accuracy. 
Please see Appendix A for detailed variable measurement. First, prior research finds that the 
market’s demand for information increases with institutional ownership (InstOwn) and 
analyst coverage (AC) (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005; Hutton 2005). Second, managers are less 
likely to have precise information when the operation environment is volatile or when firm 
complexity is high. Accordingly, we control for return volatility (RetVol) and the number of 
business and geographic segments (NumSeg). Third, Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson (1995) 
find that firms with a greater need for external capital have an incentive to disclose more 
                                                 
16 While empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that firms typically exclude one-time items from their 
earnings forecasts, to ensure that our results are not driven by the inclusion of goodwill impairment charges, we 
hand-collect a subsample of earnings forecasts to verify that the impairment charge is excluded from both the 
earnings forecast and actual earnings reported in First Call. Moreover, our inferences remain when we exclude 
firm-years with goodwill impairments during the sample period.  
17 In untabulated analyses, we exclude firm fixed effects and include the main effect of Treatment. The 
inferences remain the same.  
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information in order to reduce information asymmetry. Accordingly, we include an indicator 
variable for firms that issue additional equity during the fiscal year (EqIss), as reported in 
Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Global New Issues database. Fourth, we control for firm 
size measured as the natural logarithm of assets (Log(AT)), leverage (Leverage), operating 
cash flows (CF), and the market-to-book ratio (MTB). Fifth, we control for contemporaneous 
accounting (ROA, Loss) and stock (Ret) performance because they can affect voluntary 
disclosure decisions (Miller 2002). Sixth, we control for forecast horizon (Horizon). 
Managers have more precise information when it is closer to the fiscal-period-end, and thus 
forecasts issued later in the fiscal period have greater accuracy. We expect forecast accuracy 
to be positively associated with InstOwn, AC, EqIss, Log(AT), MTB, ROA, Ret, and CF, and 
negatively associated with RetVol, Numseg, Loss, Leverage, and Horizon. Lastly, we include 
firm fixed effects to control for the effect of time-invariant firm characteristics. In an 
untabulated analysis, we control for industry-year combination fixed effects and the 
inferences remain the same. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics on control variables, separately for 
treatment and control firms. It also reports the differences in means between the two groups 
for the pre- and post-periods. As reported in the table, relative to control firms, treatment 
firms experience a smaller increase in institutional ownership, a larger decrease in equity 
issuances, and a smaller increase in ROA, but similar changes in other variables, after the 
adoption of SFAS 142.18 Nonetheless, it is important to control for the impact of these firm 
characteristics in the analyses.  
                                                 
18 The similarity between the two groups in other characteristics is likely due to our sampling requirement that 
both the treatment and control groups issue earnings forecasts at least once in both the pre- and post-SFAS 142 
periods. Prior research suggests that forecasting firms are typically larger than the average Compustat firm. For 
example, the average market capitalization is 5.6 billion for our sample firms, but only 3.8 billion for the 
average firm in Compustat / CRSP merged dataset.  
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[Insert Table 1] 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the industry distribution. There is a large variation in 
industry concentration between treatment and control firms. About 29% of the treatment 
firms are in the manufacturing industry, while 32% of the control firms are in utilities. The 
other highly represented industries include retail, computers, finance, insurance, and real 
estate. The inclusion of firm dummies controls for industry effects. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Univariate analyses 
Table 2 presents the univariate analysis, the difference-in-differences comparison of 
Forecast Accuracy between the treatment and control firms. The average Forecast Accuracy 
is -0.0518 in the pre-SFAS 142 period and -0.0278 in the post-SFAS 142 period for the 
treatment firms. The improvement, 0.0240, is significant at the 0.01 level. Control firms also 
experience an increase in forecast accuracy; the average Forecast Accuracy is -0.0358 in the 
pre-SFAS 142 period and -0.0253 in the post-SFAS 142 period.19 The difference in 
differences, 0.0135, is significant at the 0.03 level. This result suggests that while both 
treatment and control firms experience an improvement in forecast accuracy, the 
improvement is significantly greater for treatment firms, the firms affected by SFAS 142, 
consistent with H1.  
[Insert Table 2] 
4.2 Regression analysis: Test of H1 
Table 3 presents the regression results. In Column (1), we estimate the baseline 
regression. The coefficient on Post142 × Treatment is significantly positive (p = 0.001), 
                                                 
19 As shown in Table 3, control firms do not experience an improvement in forecast accuracy after controlling 
for other factors that likely affect forecast accuracy.  
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indicating that treatment firms experience a greater increase in forecast accuracy than control 
firms after the adoption of SFAS 142. In terms of economic magnitude, this incremental 
change represents a relative improvement of 26% (=0.0137/0.0518) for treatment firms.  
[Insert Table 3] 
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with those reported in prior 
research. We find that larger firms and firms with more analysts following, higher market-to-
book, and higher ROA issue more accurate forecasts. We also find that firms with more 
segments and higher leverage instead issue less accurate forecasts. We also find that forecasts 
with shorter horizons tend to be more accurate. 
We adopt two alternative research designs to provide further support for H1. These two 
designs are less susceptible to the concern that treatment firms are fundamentally different 
from control firms and they are affected by contemporaneous changes differently. However, 
the tradeoff is that the sample size is smaller, reducing the generalizability of the results. 
First, we use the propensity score matching approach to identify a group of control firms with 
similar firm characteristics as treatment firms. To perform the matching, we first estimate the 
propensity score as the conditional probability that a firm is a treatment firm based on firm 
characteristics over the pre-SFAS 142 period. The firm characteristics are the control 
variables used in our main regressions. Then, for each control firm, we find two treatment 
firms with the closest propensity score across all possible permutations of pairs without 
replacement. Note that the sample has more treatment firms than control firms. Column (2) of 
Table 3 presents the regression results. Consistent with H1, we continue to find a positive 
coefficient on the interaction term Post142 × Treatment (p = 0.007).20  
                                                 
20 In untabulated analyses, we use two alternative matching approaches, coarsened exact matching and entropy 
balancing, and obtain the same inferences. Similarly, the inferences continue to hold if we conduct the analyses 
by matching treatment firm with control firm on (1) industry and size, (2) industry and performance, or (3) size 
and performance. We do not use all three dimensions at the same time because the resulting sample is too small 
to conduct meaningful analyses.  
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Second, we examine whether, within treatment firms, those with more goodwill 
experience greater improvements in forecast accuracy in the post period. For firms with 
relatively large magnitudes of goodwill, managers have to spend more time valuing the 
reporting units, likely uncovering more information. In addition, due to the size of goodwill 
relative to other type of assets, the uncovered information is likely to be more important in 
forming the forecasts of the firm’s overall earnings. For this test, we redefine Treatment in 
Equation (1) as an indicator variable that is equal to one if the ratio of goodwill to long-term 
tangible assets in the post-SFAS 142 period is in the top quartile of the treatment sample, and 
zero otherwise. Column (3) reports the regression results. Consistent with H1, we find a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term Post142 × Treatment (p = 0.027).  
In an untabulated analysis, we redefine the treatment firms as those that report goodwill 
impairment charges at least once in the post-SFAS 142 period, 198 firms in total. However, 
we find insignificant or marginally significant results based on this alternative classification 
of treatment firms, depending on the model specifications. This weaker or insignificant result 
might be due to the smaller sample size and thus lower power of the test. In addition, the 
economic conditions that lead to goodwill impairment charges might also be associated with 
higher uncertainty, biasing against finding an improvement in forecast accuracy. 
Overall, the above results are consistent with H1 that, under SFAS 142, treatment firms 
experience an improvement in management forecast accuracy, a proxy for the quality of 
internal information environment.  
4.3 Cross-sectional analyses – the level of monitoring in the pre-SFAS 142 period: Test of 
H2 
To test H2, we construct an indicator variable, High_Monitoring, which equals one for 
firms identified as having strong monitoring in the pre-SFAS 142 period. We use three 
variables to measure a firm’s strength of monitoring: board independence, market value of 
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equity, and a common factor obtained from a factor analysis of three attributes of monitoring 
or the lack of it:  CEO entrenchment as captured by G-index, CEO tenure, and audit quality 
as captured by an indicator for Big 4 auditors. (Note that higher G-index and longer CEO 
tenure imply weaker monitoring.) We add the interaction terms between High_Monitoring 
and both Post142 and Post142 × Treatment to Equation (1): 
Forecast Accuracy = β0 + β1 Post142 + β2 Post142 × Treatment + β3 Post142 × 
High_Monitoring + β4 Post142 × Treatment × 
High_Monitoring + Controls + Firm Dummies + e         (2) 
Note that High_Monitoring and High_Monitoring × Treatment are not included in the 
regression as they are subsumed by firm fixed effects. In this regression, the coefficient on 
Post142 × Treatment captures the incremental change in forecast accuracy for treatment 
firms with weak monitoring and the coefficient on Post142 × Treatment × High_Monitoring 
captures the incremental change in forecast accuracy for treatment firms with strong 
monitoring relative to those with weak monitoring. H2 implies a negative coefficient on this 
three-way interaction.  
 Table 4 presents the regression results. In Column (1), High_Monitoring equals one if 
board independence in the pre-SFAS 142 period is higher than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. As reported in the table, the coefficient on the three-way interaction term, Post142 
× Treatment × High_Monitoring, is significantly negative (p = 0.028). In Column (2), 
High_Monitoring equals one if market value of equity measured over the pre-SFAS 142 
period is higher than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Again, we find that the 
coefficient on the three-way interaction term is significantly negative (p = 0.020). In Column 
(3), High_Monitoring equals one if the common factor obtained from the factor analysis in 
the pre-SFAS 142 period is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Again, we find that 
the coefficient on the three-way interaction term is significantly negative (p = 0.005).  
Overall, these results indicate that compared with other treatment firms, those subject to 
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stronger monitoring before the introduction of SFAS 142 experience a smaller improvement 
in forecast accuracy after the adoption, as predicted in H2.  
[Insert Table 4] 
4.4 Cross-sectional analyses – goodwill impairment likelihood: Test of H3 
The research design for the test of H3 is similar to that for H2. We construct an 
indicator variable, High_Likelihood, to capture managers’ incentives to exert effort during the 
impairment testing process due to a higher likelihood of goodwill impairment. We then add 
the interaction terms between the indicator variable and both Post142 and Post142 × 
Treatment to Equation (1): 
Forecast Accuracy = β0 + β1 Post142 + β2 Post142 × Treatment + β3 Post142 × 
High_Likelihood + β4 Post142 × Treatment × High_Likelihood + 
Controls + Firm Dummies + e       (3) 
We use three variables to capture the ex-ante likelihood of goodwill impairment: change in 
the market-to-book ratio, change in the competition intensity, and the estimated likelihood of 
impairment from an impairment probability model. As in Equation (2), the coefficient of 
interest is that on the three-way interaction term, Post142 × Treatment × High_Likelihood, 
which captures the difference in the change in forecast accuracy between treatment firms 
with a higher likelihood of goodwill impairment and other treatment firms. H3 implies a 
positive coefficient on this three-way interaction term. 
Table 5 reports the regression results of Equation (3). In Column (1), we define 
High_Likelihood as one if the change in the market-to-book ratio from the pre- to the post-
SFAS 142 period is in the bottom quintile of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. The 
market-to-book ratio is a primary indicator for goodwill impairment, and firms with a severe 
decline in the market-to-book ratio are more likely to write-off goodwill. As reported in the 
table, the coefficient on Post142 × Treatment× High_Likelihood is significantly positive (p = 
0.015). In Column (2), we define High_Likelihood as one if the change in competition as 
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perceived by managers from the pre- to the post-SFAS 142 period is positive (i.e., more 
intensified competition), and zero otherwise. Firms often research their competitors to 
determine whether an impairment charge should be recognized (Holtman and Sinnett 2009; 
Chen et al. 2013). Following Li, Lundholm, and Minnis (2013), we measure the extent of 
competition based on the number of competition-related words scaled by the total number of 
words in the 10K.21 Again, the coefficient on Post142 × Treatment× High_Likelihood is 
significantly positive (p = 0.038).  
Lastly, we use an impairment probability model similar to that in Francis et al. (1996) 
and Riedl (2004). Specifically, we estimate the probability of impairment as a function of the 
change in GDP, the change in the firm’s industry ROA, the change in the firm’s pre-write-off 
earnings, the change in the firm’s analyst forecast EPS, and audit quality, along with 
managers’ reporting incentives related to big bath and earnings smoothing.22 We then define 
High_Likelihood as one if the probability of impairment estimated from the determinant 
model is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. As reported in Column (3), the 
coefficient on the three-way interaction term is significantly positive (p = 0.027). These 
results are consistent with the notion that firms facing a higher likelihood of goodwill 
impairment spend more time collecting information to calculate the fair value and, therefore, 
experience a greater improvement in the internal information environment. 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
5. Additional Analyses 
                                                 
21 We thank Feng Li for sharing his competition data at http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/. Li et al. (2013) 
provide a comprehensive validation test of the competition measure. We also conduct a validation test and find 
that the competition measure is negatively associated with future profitability after controlling for current 
profitability for our sample firms. 
22 We thank the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion. Because the number of firm-years with goodwill 
impairment is very small, we combined the cases of fixed asset impairment with goodwill impairment when 
estimating the impairment probability model.  
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In this section, we report several additional analyses to investigate the robustness of the 
results and to provide additional insights. We first broaden the scope of the analyses by 
examining the change in management forecast credibility – the market’s perception of 
forecast accuracy, and the speed of earnings announcements – an alternative proxy for 
internal information environment quality. We then investigate the robustness of the results by 
conducting two falsification tests, by more explicitly controlling for contemporaneous 
regulatory changes (e.g., SOX), and by refuting an alternative explanation based on earnings 
management.  
5.1 Management forecast credibility 
Prior studies on management forecasts argue that investors will respond more strongly 
to forecasts of higher credibility, with the market reaction being more positive (negative) for 
each unit of good (bad) news (Williams 1996; Rogers and Stocken 2005). Thus, if investors 
believe that forecasts issued by treatment firms in the post-SFAS 142 period are more 
informative and accurate, then they should react more strongly to these forecasts. To test this 
conjecture, we estimate the following equation: 
 CAR(-1,1) = β0 + β1 Post142 + β2 Post142 × Treatment + β3 Surprise+ β4 Surprise × 
Post142 + β5 Surprise × Treatment + β6 Surprise × Post142 × Treatment 
+ Firm Dummies + e         (4) 
CAR(-1,1) is the three-day market-adjusted return centered on the forecast issuance date. 
Surprise is the decile rank of forecast surprise, standardized to the range [0, 1], where 
forecast surprise is management forecast minus the prevailing analyst consensus, scaled by 
the beginning-of-period stock price. Our focus is β6, which captures the incremental effect of 
management forecast credibility for treatment firms in the post-SFAS 142 period compared 
with control firms; we expect the coefficient to be positive. 
Table 6 reports the regression results. As expected, the coefficient on Surprise is 
significantly positive, consistent with the market reaction being higher for good news than for 
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bad news. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient on Surprise × Post142 × 
Treatment is significantly positive (p = 0.056). This result indicates that earnings forecasts 
issued by treatment firms in the post-SFAS 142 period elicit a stronger market reaction than 
those issued in the pre-SFAS 142 period, compared with control firms. That is, the forecasts 
issued by treatment firms after SFAS 142 are perceived to be more credible.    
[Insert Table 6] 
5.2 Earnings announcement speed as an alternative proxy for the internal information 
environment quality 
Following Gallemore and Labro (2015), we use the speed in which earnings are 
announced as an alternative measure of a firm’s internal information environment quality. If 
the goodwill impairment test requires firms to collect information about the reporting units 
with goodwill in a timelier fashion and allows managers to more quickly integrate this 
information into the financial reporting system, then it should reduce the financial statement 
preparation time between the fiscal period end and the earnings announcement date. To test 
this conjecture, we replace the dependent variable in Equation (1) with Speed of EA, defined 
as negative one times the natural logarithm of the average difference in days between the 
fiscal quarter-end and the earnings announcement date across the quarters for each firm-year. 
Table 7 reports the regression results. Consistent with our expectation, we find a significantly 
positive coefficient on Post142 × Treatment (p = 0.005). The magnitude of the coefficient 
suggests a relative decrease of 5.9% (= (-1) × [e0.0574-1]) in the preparation time for treatment 
firms in the post-SFAS 142 period.  
[Insert Table 7] 
In untabulated analyses, we also examine alternative management forecast 
characteristics and find that treatment firms provide more frequent and precise earnings 
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forecasts after the adoption of SFAS 142.23 Together with the results in Table 7, these 
findings suggest that SFAS 142 adoption affects not only management forecast accuracy, but 
also other measures that capture the quality of firms’ internal information environment. 
5.3 Falsification tests 
To further strengthen the inferences, we conduct two sets of falsification tests. In the 
first test, we use other intangible assets to identify pseudo-treatment firms and in the second 
test, we use a different year as the pseudo-adoption year.  
First, SFAS 142 changed accounting for goodwill, but not for other intangibles with 
finite lives. If the results documented above are driven by the fundamental differences 
between treatment and control firms, trends in M&A activities over time, or other 
contemporaneous regulatory changes, we should find similar results when we identify 
treatment and control firms based on the level of other intangible assets. However, if the 
above results are driven by the adoption of SFAS 142, we should not find similar results 
when we conduct a similar analysis of other intangible assets because SFAS 142 does not 
affect accounting for other intangible assets with finite lives. To distinguish between these 
two alternative explanations, we examine whether our result holds using firms with Other 
Intangibles as a pseudo-treatment group. The research design is similar to that for our main 
analysis. Specifically, Pseudo_Treatment equals one if the firm reports Other Intangibles 
throughout the six-year sample period as recorded in Compustat, and zero for pseudo control 
firms, which do not report Other Intangibles at any point in time during the period.24 The 
                                                 
23 We also examine whether SFAS 142 reduces the likelihood of firms having an earnings restatement in 
untabulated analyses. We differentiate between restatements due to unintentional clerical errors and those due to 
frauds. While we find that treatment firms are less likely to have a restatement due to clerical errors in the post-
SFAS 142 period, we do not find that there is an incremental change in the likelihood of frauds for treatment 
firms. This is not surprising since goodwill impairment tests are conducted at the reporting unit level and fraud-
related restatements are usually related to top executives’ incentives. 
24 Other Intangibles arise primarily from companies’ purchased intangible assets and the allocation of purchase 
price as a result of M&A activities. The amount of Other Intangibles is not trivial, as shown in Appendix B. 
Firms reporting Other Intangibles in some years but not in others are excluded from the sample to increase the 
power of the test. Also, we require pseudo-treatment and pseudo-control firms to issue at least one management 
forecast in both the pre- and post-SFAS 142 periods. 
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sample includes all firm-years with management forecasts issued by these pseudo-treatment 
and pseudo-control firms in the sample period. Appendix B presents the descriptive statistics 
for the pseudo-treatment and pseudo-control firms.25 Column (1) of Table 8 reports the 
regression results. As reported in the table, the coefficient on Post142 × Pseudo_Treatment is 
insignificantly different from zero (p = 0.934).  
[Insert Table 8] 
However, we note that the other intangible assets reported in Compustat can include 
intangible assets with finite lives as well as those with infinite lives. Since other intangibles 
with infinite lives are subject to the same accounting treatment as goodwill, they could 
confound the results reported in Column (1). In addition, some of the pseudo-treatment firms 
report goodwill, also potentially confounding the above results. To address these issues, we 
hand-collect data on Other Intangibles from footnotes of firms’ financial statements and 
exclude pseudo-treatment firms with other intangibles with infinite lives or goodwill. The 
remaining pseudo-treatment firms only have other intangible assets with finite lives, 
providing a cleaner test, but the tradeoff is that the sample size is much smaller. Column (2) 
of Table 8 reports the results based on this subset of pseudo-treatment. As reported in the 
table, the inferences remain the same.   
Second, if the results documented above are not driven by SFAS 142 but by the 
differential time trend for treatment and control firms, we should find similar results when we 
use a different year as the adoption year. We choose 2006 as the pseudo-adoption year so as 
to exclude the calendar year of SFAS 142 adoption (i.e., 2002) from the pseudo-pre-adoption 
period. We identify treatment and control firms using the same approach as described in 
                                                 
25 Note that we require treatment (control) firms to have (not have) goodwill throughout the sample period and 
pseudo-treatment (control) firms to have (not have) Other Intangibles throughout the sample period. The firms 
that have goodwill in some years but not in other years are excluded from the main analysis. Similarly, the firms 
that have Other Intangibles in some years but not in other years are excluded from the falsification test. As such, 
the overlap between the two classifications is not very high. Approximately 37% (47%) of the observations in 
the pseudo-treatment (control) group are also classified as treatment (control) firms in the main analysis. 
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Section 3.1. Pseudo_Post 142 equals one (zero) for years 2007 through 2009 (2003 through 
2005).26 Column (3) of Table 8 reports the regression results for this analysis. As reported in 
the table, the coefficient on Pseudo_Post142 × Treatment is insignificantly different from 
zero (p = 0.834).  
Overall, these results suggest that our findings, as documented above, are attributable to 
the adoption of SFAS 142, not to the fundamental differences between treatment and control 
firms or contemporaneous changes. 
5.4 Contemporaneous regulatory changes as an alternative explanation 
An alternative explanation for our results is that they are driven by other 
contemporaneous regulatory or macroeconomic changes. Our sample period overlaps with 
various regulatory changes, especially the SOX Act. For these contemporaneous changes to 
drive our results, they must affect treatment firms and control firms differently. However, we 
do not have a strong reason to believe this to be the case. Nevertheless, we conduct two 
additional analyses and provide additional evidence that our results are unlikely to be 
attributable to SOX. First, one important requirement of SOX is that firms disclose the 
quality of their internal control system under Section 302 and auditor evaluate the quality of 
the internal control systems under Section 404. One might argue that due to their complexity, 
treatment firms had more internal control weaknesses and as a result of the disclosure 
requirement, treatment firms improve their internal control effectiveness, leading to an 
improvement in internal information environment and management forecast accuracy. In 
contrast to this alternative explanation, we do not find that treatment firms have a higher 
likelihood of internal control material weaknesses than control firms. To further address this 
concern, we replicate the main test after excluding observations of firms with internal control 
weaknesses in any of the year during the sample period (about 17% of the sample). Panel A 
                                                 
26 Our inferences do not change when we choose 1998 as an alternative pseudo-adoption year.  
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of Table 9 reports the results. We find that the coefficient on Post142 × Treatment continues 
to be significantly positive (p = 0.001).  
[Insert Table 9] 
Second, SOX requires firms to have majority independent boards, leading to an increase 
in board independence, especially for firms that did not satisfy the requirement before SOX. 
However, we do not find that treatment firms experience a larger increase in board 
independence than control firms. Moreover, when we explicitly control for the impact of the 
increase in board independence (∆BIND) by adding its interaction term with Post142, as 
reported in Panel B of Table 9, we continue to find a significantly positive coefficient on 
Post142 × Treatment (p = 0.005).  
Altogether, these results suggest that the improvement in forecast accuracy documented 
above is not driven by other contemporaneous changes in regulation, particularly the SOX 
Act. We also rule out the possibility that our results are driven by the dotcom bubble, which 
coincides with the pre-SFAS 142 period and might affect treatment firms more than control 
firms.27 Of course, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that other unknown 
contemporaneous regulatory changes at least partially explain our results.  
5.5 Earnings management as an alternative explanation 
Another alternative explanation for the increased forecast accuracy for the treatment 
firms in the post-SFAS 142 period is that the two-step impairment tests provide managers 
with more information and that managers exploit the extra information to engage in earnings 
                                                 
27 During the dotcom bubble, treatment firms engaged in more acquisitions and likely wrote off goodwill in the 
post-SFAS 142 period. Therefore, one may argue that treatment firms experience an improvement in forecast 
accuracy in the post-SFAS 142 period because they were overvalued during the bubble period or because bad 
acquisitions were written off after the bubble. However, to the extent that the dotcom bubble affects high-tech 
firms most, we obtain similar results after we exclude from our sample the firms in high-tech industries (three-
digit SIC codes of 357 or 737). The inferences also remain the same after we remove firms that are likely 
overvalued during the pre-SFAS 142 period – the firms with the change in average annual returns from the pre- 
and post-SFAS 142 period in the bottom 10%, 20%, 30%, or 40% of the sample distribution. 
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management in order to avoid missing their own forecasts.28 Note that this interpretation 
differs from our inference in that managers use the information opportunistically rather than 
for better decision-making. If firms use discretionary accruals to meet or beat their own 
forecasts under the earnings management explanation (Kasznik 1999), then we should expect 
more discretionary accruals for treatment firms in the post-SFAS 142 period than in the pre-
SFAS 142 period, compared with control firms. Similarly, if treatment firms use management 
forecasts to guide analyst expectations, then we should observe that treatment firms are more 
likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts than control firms. However, we fail to find 
consistent evidence with either argument, suggesting that the improvement in forecast 
accuracy is unlikely to be driven by more earnings management after the SFAS 142 adoption.  
 
6. The effect of SFAS 142 on investment efficiency and firm performance 
6.1  SFAS 142 adoption, the improvement in information environment, and M&A quality  
In this section, we examine whether treatment firms with greater improvement in 
forecast accuracy make better M&A decisions. To the extent that SFAS 142 improves 
managers’ information sets, the newly acquired information can help managers better 
evaluate the potential synergy between the current operating units and potential targets, 
leading to better M&A decisions.29 Indeed, one of the interviewed executives commented that 
knowing that the company has to perform an impairment exercise every period forces senior 
management to make sure that the acquisition is sound; otherwise they face the possibility of 
goodwill impairment later on. 
Following prior research, we capture M&A quality using announcement returns 
                                                 
28 Note that both actual and forecasted earnings are before goodwill impairment. Thus, the results are not 
consistent with the notion that managers use goodwill impairment to manage earnings. 
29 We focus on the quality of M&As, not the overall investment quality, because goodwill primarily arises from 
the synergy of acquisitions and thus managers likely pay particular attention to the quality of past M&As during 
the impairment tests. 
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(AcqCAR(-1,+1)) based on the three-day cumulative market-adjusted return centered on the 
M&A announcement date. Because not all treatment firms experience an improvement in 
management forecast accuracy, the prediction only applies to treatment firms with an 
improvement in management forecast accuracy. Thus, our analysis focuses on the 
comparison between treatment firms with and those without an improvement in management 
forecast accuracy. We then estimate the following equation to examine whether treatment 
firms with an improvement in forecast accuracy experience an increase in M&A quality 
following the SFAS 142 adoption: 
AcqCAR(-1,+1) = β0 + β1 Post142 + β2 Post142 × Improvement + Controls + Firm 
Dummies +  e         (5) 
 
Improvement is a dummy variable that equals one if the change in forecast accuracy from the 
pre- to the post-SFAS 142 period is above the median of all treatment firms, and zero 
otherwise. A positive coefficient on Post142 × Improvement suggests that treatment firms 
with an improvement in forecast accuracy due to SFAS 142 experience higher M&A 
announcement returns in the post-SFAS 142 period than other treatment firms. We estimate 
Equation (5) using treatment firms alone because M&A transactions are rare for control 
firms.  
Panel A of Table 10 describes the control variables used in this analysis and presents 
the regression results based on the treatment firms that have M&A announcements in both the 
pre- and post-SFAS 142 periods. We find a significantly positive coefficient on Post142 × 
Improvement (p = 0.056), indicating that an improvement in forecast accuracy is associated 
with higher M&A announcement returns in the post-SFAS 142 period, consistent with our 
conjecture that treatment firms with an improvement in their internal information 
environment quality make better M&A decisions.  
 [Insert Table 10] 
6.2 SFAS 142 adoption, the improvement in information environment, and internal capital 
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market efficiency 
In this section, we examine whether an improvement in the information environment 
leads to higher internal capital market efficiency (ICM Efficiency) based on the extent to 
which a firm allocates more (less) of its capital to the operating units with higher (lower) 
future profitability. Given that managers have better information about specific reporting 
units, they likely make better capital allocation decisions after the adoption of SFAS 142. As 
one of the interviewed executives commented, “The impairment exercise is a very good 
discipline, and it is a necessary discipline….Because whatever impairment you take for 
goodwill will flow through your P&L, it does affect our capital allocation.” Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation to examine whether the efficiency of internal capital 
allocation improves following SFAS 142 for treatment firms: 
ICM Efficiencyi,t = β0 + β1 Post142 + β2 Post142 × Treatment + β3 Post142 × 
Treatment × Improvement + Controls + Firm Dummies + ei,t (6) 
 
Please see the note to Panel B of Table 10 for a detailed description of ICM Efficiency. 
Improvement is as defined above. Since we are only interested in the incremental effect of 
information improvement on ICM Efficiency for treatment firms, Improvement is set to zero 
for all control firms; as such, we do not include Post142 × Improvement in the regression. A 
positive coefficient on Post142 × Treatment × Improvement suggests that firms with an 
improvement in forecast accuracy due to SFAS 142 also experience an improvement in 
internal capital allocation efficiency in the post-SFAS 142 period.  
Panel B of Table 10 presents the regression results based on the sample of firms with 
ICM Efficiency data available in both periods. Consistent with our conjecture, we find a 
significantly positive coefficient on Post142 × Treatment × Improvement (p = 0.005), 
indicating that the treatment firms with an improvement in forecast accuracy is associated 
with a greater improvement in internal capital market efficiency in the post-SFAS 142 period 
than other treatment firms.  
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6.3 SFAS 142 adoption, the improvement in information environment, and firm 
performance 
If SFAS 142 improves the information environment and helps managers make better 
investment decisions, it should eventually translate into improved firm performance. As such, 
we examine whether treatment firms with improved forecast accuracy also enjoy better 
performance after the adoption of SFAS 142. Specifically, we estimate the following 
equation to examine whether ROA improves following SFAS 142 for treatment firms: 
ROAi,t = β0 + β1 Post142 + β2 Post142 × Treatment + β3 Post142 × Treatment × 
Improvement + Lagged ROA + Firm Dummies + ei,t (7) 
 
Similar to the analysis above, since we are only interested in the incremental effect of 
information improvement on ROA for treatment firms, Improvement is set to zero for all 
control firms; as such, we do not include Post142 × Improvement in the regression. A 
positive coefficient on Post142 × Treatment × Improvement suggests that firms with an 
improvement in forecast accuracy due to SFAS 142 also experience an improvement in 
performance in the post-SFAS 142 period.  
Panel C of Table 10 presents the regression results. Consistent with our conjecture, we 
find a significantly positive coefficient on Post142 × Treatment × Improvement (p = 0.015), 
indicating that the treatment firms with an improvement in forecast accuracy are also able to 
generate better performance in the post-SFAS 142 period than other treatment firms. 
In sum, the results reported in this section indicate that the treatment firms experiencing 
an improvement in management forecast accuracy make better M&A and internal capital 
allocation decisions and have better performance in the post-SFAS 142 period than other 
treatment firms.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the effect of a change in a firm’s financial reporting on its 
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internal information environment by investigating the impact of SFAS 142 adoption on 
management forecast accuracy, a proxy for internal information environment quality. We 
argue that a mandatory change in external reporting induces managers to acquire new 
information and, therefore, improves managers’ information sets and the internal information 
environment. The adoption of SFAS 142 is an ideal setting to test this effect because it 
requires firms to perform a two-step impairment test, which includes calculating the fair 
value of the reporting units at least annually, inducing managers to collect information they 
otherwise would not have.  
Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that firms affected by SFAS 
142 experience a greater increase in their forecast accuracy than other firms, consistent with 
an improvement in firms’ internal information environment quality following the adoption of 
SFAS 142. The effect is less pronounced for firms with stronger monitoring in the pre-SFAS 
142 period, but is more pronounced for firms with a higher likelihood of goodwill 
impairment in the post-SFAS 142 period. Treatment firms also experience an improvement in 
the speed of earnings announcements. A series of additional tests indicate that the results are 
not driven by the differences between treatment and control firms or by contemporaneous 
regulatory changes. We also find that firms that experience an improvement in forecast 
accuracy are associated with better M&A decisions, more efficient internal capital 
allocations, and better performance in the post-SFAS 142 period. These results indicate that 
improved internal information environment is one of the channels through which the change 
in external financial reporting affects corporate decisions and future performance.  
 The findings in this paper suggest that a change in external financial reporting can 
have a positive effect on firms’ internal information environment and, as such, should be of 
interest to standard setters, practitioners, and researchers.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
  
Key dependent variable 
Forecast Accuracy = management forecast accuracy, averaged across management forecasts each 
firm-year, calculated as the absolute value of the difference between 
management earnings forecast and actual earnings multiplied by negative 
one, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
 
Independent variables of interest 
Post142 = an indicator variable that equals one for the post-SFAS 142 period, and zero 
otherwise. 
Treatment = an indicator variable that equals one for firms in the treatment group, and 
zero for control firms. 
 
Control variables 
InstOwn = institutional ownership, measured as the number of shares held by 
institutional investors as reported in Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) 
Holdings database divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Firms 
not covered by 13f institutions are assumed to have zero institutional 
ownership. 
AC = analyst coverage, calculated as the number of unique analysts who issue 
earnings forecasts for the firm as reported in the IBES database. Firms not 
covered by IBES are assumed to have zero analyst coverage. 
RetVol = return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock 
returns over the fiscal year. 
NumSeg = the number of business and geographic segments. 
EqIss = an indicator variable that equals one for firms that issue additional equity 
during the fiscal year as reported in Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
Global New Issues database. 
Log(AT) = the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
MTB = the market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. A firm’s market 
value of equity is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied 
by the closing price at its fiscal year-end. 
ROA=  return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by 
the beginning-of-period total assets. 
Ret = the market-adjusted annual return over the fiscal year. 
Loss = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s income before 
extraordinary items is less than zero, and zero otherwise. 
Leverage = long term debt plus debt in current liabilities, scaled by total assets. 
CF =  Operating cash flows divided by the beginning-of-period total assets. 
Horizon = the number of days between managers’ forecast date and the fiscal period-
end, averaged across each firm-year, scaled by 365. 
 
Partitioning variables 
High_Monitoring = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s board independence,  
market value of equity, and the common factor of monitoring measured over 
the pre-SFAS 142 period is above the sample median in Columns (1), (2), 
and (3) of Table 4, respectively, and zero otherwise. Board independence 
(BIND) is defined as the proportion of unaffiliated board directors on the 
board. Market value of equity (MVE) is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the closing price at the fiscal year-end. The 
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common factor of monitoring is obtained from a factor analysis of three 
proxies for monitoring: G-index (inverse ranking), CEO tenure (inverse 
ranking), and an indicator for Big 4 auditors. 
High_Likelihood = an indicator variable that equals one if the change in the market-to-book 
ratio (MTB) from the pre- to the post-SFAS 142 period is in the bottom 
quintile of the sample distribution (Column (1) of Table 5), the change in 
firm competition (Competition) from the pre- to the post-SFAS 142 period is 
positive (Column (2) of Table 5), or the impairment probability estimated 
over the post-SFAS 142 period is above the sample median (Column (3) of 
Table 5), and zero otherwise. Competition is measured as the number of 
competition-related words scaled by the total number of words in the 10K, as 
in Li et al. (2013). Similar to Francis et al.’s (1996) and Riedl’s (2004) 
prediction model, the impairment probability is estimated as a function of 
the change in GDP, the change in the firm’s industry ROA, the change in the 
firm’s pre-write-off earnings, the change in the firm’s analyst forecast EPS, 
and audit quality, along with managerial reporting incentives related to big 
bath and earnings smoothing. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for Pseudo-Treatment and Pseudo-Control Samples 
 
 
 Pre-SFAS 142 Period  Post-SFAS 142 Period    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  Pseudo Treatment Pseudo Control
Diff. 
Pseudo Treatment Pseudo Control 
Diff. Diff. in Diff.  Group Group Group Group 
 (N=588) (N=248) (N=816) (N=351) 
 Mean Mean p-val. Mean Mean p-val. Mean p-val. 
InstOwn 0.4948 0.4976 0.90 0.6341 0.6403 0.72 -0.0034 0.90 
AC 9.5629 8.2298 0.01 9.5551 9.3789 0.69 -1.1569 0.08* 
RetVol 0.0354 0.0364 0.36 0.0207 0.0229 0.00 -0.0012 0.33 
NumSeg 4.7602 3.8105 0.00 4.9400 3.5271 0.00 0.4632 0.07* 
EqIss 0.0782 0.0685 0.63 0.0539 0.0541 0.99 -0.0099 0.68 
Log(AT) 7.2071 6.6857 0.00 7.4223 6.9636 0.00 -0.0627 0.70 
AT (million) 4894.79 3377.97 0.04 6490.22 4730.98 0.02 242.42 0.84 
MTB 4.1104 2.8119 0.00 3.0940 2.6915 0.05 -0.8961 0.02** 
ROA 0.0337 0.0519 0.09 0.0619 0.0690 0.22 0.0110 0.34 
Ret 0.1919 0.1840 0.87 0.0524 0.0958 0.17 -0.0512 0.36 
Loss 0.1684 0.1411 0.33 0.1054 0.1026 0.88 -0.0244 0.46 
Leverage 0.2711 0.2157 0.00  0.2278 0.1611 0.00  0.0114 0.51 
CF 0.1083 0.1065 0.84  0.1105 0.1162 0.39  -0.0075 0.45 
GW (million) 523.18 398.48 0.51  1206.41 325.80 0.00  755.92 0.04* 
Other Intangibles (million) 744.08    525.49      
 
Note: Appendix B reports summary statistics on firm characteristics for the sample of 2,003 firm-years of pseudo treatment and control firms. See Appendix 
A for variable definitions. To reduce the influence of extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Industry Composition 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 Pre-SFAS 142 Period  Post-SFAS 142 Period    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  Treatment Control 
Diff. 
Treatment Control 
Diff. Diff. in Diff.  Group Group Group Group 
 (N=787) (N=247) (N=1,111) (N=366) 
 Mean Mean p-val. Mean Mean p-val. Mean p-val. 
Control variables 
InstOwn 0.5455 0.4225 0.00 0.6699 0.6010 0.00 -0.0541 0.03** 
AC 9.0356 9.5223 0.31 8.9955 9.3989 0.32 0.0833 0.89 
RetVol 0.0350 0.0339 0.42 0.0208 0.0202 0.34 -0.0005 0.65 
NumSeg 4.9898 3.7166 0.00 5.1125 3.7459 0.00 0.0934 0.71 
EqIss 0.0673 0.0850 0.38 0.0549 0.1175 0.00 -0.0449 0.06* 
Log(AT) 7.1275 7.2223 0.49 7.4173 7.4142 0.98 0.0979 0.53 
AT (million) 4,593.04 5,899.92 0.07 5,942.88 6,894.58 0.16 355 0.75 
MTB 3.4187 3.7639 0.35 2.9454 2.8572 0.67 0.4334 0.25 
ROA 0.0535 0.0385 0.15 0.0624 0.0624 1.00 -0.0150 0.08* 
Ret 0.2163 0.1925 0.61 0.0550 0.0520 0.90 -0.0208 0.67 
Loss 0.1321 0.1457 0.59 0.0765 0.0820 0.74 0.0081 0.77 
Leverage 0.2637 0.2616 0.89  0.2162 0.2176 0.91  -0.0035 0.84 
CF 0.1145 0.1067 0.41  0.1132 0.1117 0.82  -0.0063 0.49 
GW (million) 846.39    1,123.50      
           
Partitioning variables used in cross-sectional analyses 
BIND 0.7148  0.6609  0.01  0.7662  0.7026  0.00  0.0096 0.63 
MVE (million) 5,362.42 4,416.90 0.20  6,083.35 4,847.33 0.04  290.50 0.78 
Common Factor of Monitoring 0.0401 0.1101 0.07  0.0175 0.1132 0.71  0.0821 0.17 
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MTB 3.4187 3.7639 0.35  2.9454 2.8572 0.67  0.4334 0.25 
Competition 0.6455  0.6864  0.43  0.3201 0.3536 0.22  0.0074 0.88 
Impairment Probability  0.1882 0.2013 0.20  0.2129 0.2197 0.18  0.0063 0.55 
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Table 1 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Industry Composition 
Industry Description SIC Code Treatment Firms  Control Firms  All Sample Firms 
Frequenc
y 
 %  Frequenc
y 
%  Frequenc
y 
% 
Durable manufacturers 3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-
3679 
125 29%  22 14% 147 25% 
Retail 5000-5999 73 17%  24 16% 97 16% 
Computers 3570-3579, 3670-3679, 7370-7379 48 11%  18 12% 66 11% 
Finance, insurance, real estate 6000-6799  38 9%  16 11% 54 9% 
Utilities 4900-4999  4 1%  49 32% 53 9% 
Services 7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379 44 10%  4 3% 48 8% 
Textile and printing/publishing 2200-2799 34 8%  6 4% 40 7% 
Transportation 4000-4899 16 4%  4 3% 20 3% 
Mining, construction, and 
extractive 
1000-1999, 2900-2999 18 4%  0 0% 18 3% 
Food 2000-2111 12 3%  4 3% 16 3% 
Others 26 6%  5 3% 31 5% 
Total   438 100
% 
 152 100
% 
 590 100
% 
 
Note: Table 1 reports descriptive statistics (Panel A) and industry composition (Panel B) based on a sample of 2,511 treatment and control firm-years (590 
unique firms) in the sample period. See Appendix A for variable definitions. To reduce the influence of extreme values, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles.
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Table 2 Univariate Analysis of Forecast Accuracy 
 
    
Treatment Group Control Group
Treatment-Control Difference
   [p-value]
Pre-SFAS 142 Forecast Accuracy -0.0518 -0.0358 -0.0160 *** 
Period N 787 247 [0.00]
   
Post-SFAS 142 Forecast Accuracy -0.0278 -0.0253 -0.0025
Period N 1,111 366 [0.42]
   
 Post-Pre Difference 0.0240 *** 0.0105 ** 0.0135 **
  [p-value] [0.00] [0.02] [0.03]
 
Note: Table 2 reports the means of Forecast Accuracy based on 2,511 treatment and control firm-
years. See Appendix A for variable definitions. To reduce the influence of extreme values, Forecast 
Accuracy is winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. 
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Table 3 Effect of SFAS 142 on Forecast Accuracy: Test of H1 
 
       (1)    (2)    (3) 
   Full Sample  Matched Sample   
Alternative Definition of  
Treatment and Control Firms 
  Pred.    Coef. p-val.    Coef. p-val.    Coef. p-val. 
Post142 ?  -0.0035 0.481 -0.0042 0.388 0.0067 0.101 
Post142 × Treatment +  0.0137*** 0.001 0.0112*** 0.007 0.0146** 0.027 
InstOwn +  -0.0027 0.619 -0.0018 0.565 -0.0031 0.604 
AC +  0.0025*** 0.000 0.0023*** 0.000 0.0023*** 0.000 
RetVol -  -0.0724 0.341 -0.1374 0.250 0.0579 0.607 
NumSeg -  -0.0012* 0.093 -0.0024*** 0.004 -0.0004 0.357 
EqIss +  0.0018 0.290 0.0047 0.088 0.0020 0.337 
Log(AT) +  0.0312*** 0.000 0.0269*** 0.000 0.0371*** 0.000 
MTB +  0.0019*** 0.000 0.0016*** 0.000 0.0020*** 0.000 
ROA +  0.0552** 0.030 0.0061 0.409 0.1302*** 0.001 
Ret +  -0.0141 1.000 -0.0160 1.000 -0.0147 1.000 
Loss -  -0.0081 0.061 -0.0115** 0.037 0.0000 0.503 
Leverage -  -0.0499*** 0.001 -0.0698*** 0.000 -0.0569*** 0.001 
CF +  0.0093 0.308 0.0269* 0.092 0.0096 0.333 
Horizon -  -0.0112** 0.033 -0.0016 0.414 -0.0113* 0.052 
Firm Dummies   Included Included Included 
    
N   2,511 1,881 1,898 
Adjusted R2   0.6084    0.6215    0.6428 
 
Note: Table 3 reports the results from regressions of Forecast Accuracy. In Column (1), the analysis is based on the full sample of 2,511 treatment and control 
firm-years in the sample period. In Column (2), the analysis is based on 1,881 firm-years from matched treatment and control firms in the sample period. To 
perform matching, we first estimate the propensity score as the conditional probability that a firm is a treatment firm based on firm characteristics (i.e., the 
control variables used in our main regressions) over the pre-SFAS 142 period. Then for each control firm, we find two treatment firms as close to it as 
possible in terms of the propensity score across all possible permutations of pairs without replacement. In Column (3), the analysis is based on a sample of 
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1,898 treatment firm-years in the sample period, in which Treatment is redefined to take a value of one if the ratio of goodwill to long-term tangible asset 
(PP&E) in the post-SFAS 142 period is in the top quartile of the treatment firm sample, and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for variable definitions. To 
reduce the influence of extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. P-values are based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the industry (SIC 2 digit)-year level. The p-values are one-sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise. 
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Table 4 Cross-Sectional Effect of SFAS 142 by Monitoring in the Pre-SFAS 142 period: Test of H2 
      (1)  (2)  (3) 
     High_Monitoring  
Defined Based on  
Board Independence 
 High_Monitoring  
Defined Based on  
Market Value of Equity
High_Monitoring  
Defined Based on  
Common Factor of Monitoring 
  Pred.   Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val. 
Post142 ?  -0.0047 0.587 -0.0111 0.203 -0.0106 0.210 
Post142 × Treatment +  0.0248*** 0.002 0.0281*** 0.001 0.0291*** 0.000 
Post142 × High_Monitoring ?  0.0110 0.297 0.0112 0.221 0.0127* 0.085 
Post142 × Treatment × High_Monitoring -  -0.0212** 0.028 -0.0209** 0.020 -0.0240*** 0.005 
InstOwn +  0.0052 0.341 -0.0051 0.706 -0.0119 0.815 
AC +  0.0027*** 0.000 0.0025*** 0.000 0.0017*** 0.001 
RetVol -  0.0536 0.393 -0.0905 0.309 -0.0643 0.400 
NumSeg -  -0.0010 0.182 -0.0013* 0.081 -0.0018* 0.067 
EqIss +  0.0010 0.397 0.0011 0.360 0.0025 0.322 
Log(AT) +  0.0287*** 0.000 0.0313*** 0.000 0.0430*** 0.000 
MTB +  0.0018*** 0.000 0.0018*** 0.000 0.0022*** 0.000 
ROA +  0.0491* 0.083 0.0572** 0.026 0.1334*** 0.002 
Ret +  -0.0157 1.000 -0.0141 1.000 -0.0202 1.000 
Loss -  -0.0059 0.165 -0.0086* 0.052 0.0063 0.818 
Leverage -  -0.0463*** 0.004 -0.0487*** 0.001 -0.0516** 0.020 
CF +  0.0168 0.251 0.0105 0.287 0.0180 0.231 
Horizon -  -0.0071 0.177 -0.0116** 0.031 -0.0176** 0.037 
Firm Dummies     Included Included Included 
N     2,074 2,476 1,125 
Adjusted R2     0.6238  0.6113  0.6337 
 
Note: Table 4 reports the results from regressions of Forecast Accuracy. In Column (1) ((2), (3)), the analysis is based on a sample of 2,074 (2,476, 1,125) 
treatment and control firm-years with data on the additional variables in the sample period. See Appendix A for variable definitions. To reduce the influence 
of extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the industry (SIC 2 digit)-year level. The p-values are one-sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise.   
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Table 5 Cross-Sectional Effects of SFAS 142 by Goodwill Impairment Likelihood: Test of H3 
       (1)  (2)   (3) 
    High_Likelihood  
Defined Based on  
Change in MTB 
High_Likelihood  
Defined Based on 
Change in Competition
High_Likelihood  
Defined Based on  
Impairment Probability 
  Pred.    Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val.   Coef. p-val. 
Post142 ?  0.0010 0.842 -0.0007 0.922 0.0049 0.452 
Post142 × Treatment +  0.0110** 0.015 0.0106* 0.705 0.0026 0.349 
Post142 × High_Likelihood ?  -0.0322*** 0.000 -0.0222 0.181 -0.0128 0.148 
Post142 × Treatment × High_Likelihood  +  0.0190** 0.015 0.0329** 0.038 0.0192** 0.027 
InstOwn +  -0.0056 0.728 -0.0117 0.817 -0.0044 0.681 
AC +  0.0025*** 0.000 0.0023*** 0.000 0.0025*** 0.000 
RetVol -  -0.1175 0.248 -0.1576 0.260 -0.0897 0.308 
NumSeg -  -0.0010 0.117 -0.0008 0.267 -0.0013* 0.085 
EqIss +  0.0019 0.273 0.0006 0.451 0.0013 0.353 
Log(AT) +  0.0322*** 0.000 0.0347*** 0.000 0.0312*** 0.000 
MTB +  0.0016*** 0.000 0.0025*** 0.000 0.0019*** 0.000 
ROA +  0.0554** 0.026 0.0602 0.160 0.0579** 0.026 
Ret +  -0.0151 1.000 -0.0147 1.000 -0.0141 1.000 
Loss -  -0.0083* 0.055 -0.0097 0.118 -0.0090** 0.043 
Leverage -  -0.0494*** 0.001 -0.0506*** 0.007 -0.0525*** 0.001 
CF +  0.0088 0.319 0.0172 0.256 0.0108 0.285 
Horizon  -  -0.0119** 0.028 -0.0070 0.203 -0.0116** 0.033 
Firm Dummies     Included Included Included 
N     2,476 1,424 2,431 
Adjusted R2   0.6133 0.6298 0.5746 
 
Note: Table 5 reports the results from regressions of Forecast Accuracy. In Column (1) ((2), (3)), the analysis is based on a sample of 2,476 (1,424, 2,431) 
treatment and control firm-years with data on additional variables in the sample period. See Appendix A for variable definitions. To reduce the influence of 
extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at 
the industry (SIC 2 digit)-year level. The p-values are one-sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise. 
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Table 6 Effect of SFAS 142 on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.
Post142 ?  0.0632*** 0.000
Post142 × Treatment ?  -0.0219 0.235
Surprise +  0.1324*** 0.000
Surprise ×  Post142 ?  -0.0640*** 0.006
Surprise ×  Treatment ?  -0.0012 0.964
Surprise ×  Post142 × Treatment +  0.0432* 0.056
Firm Dummies   Included 
    
N   2,501 
Adjusted R2   0.2206 
 
Note: Table 6 reports the results from regressions of market reaction to management forecasts based 
on a sample of 2,501 firm-years. The dependent variable, CAR(-1,+1), is the three-day cumulative 
market-adjusted return centered on the management forecast date, averaged across management 
forecasts for each firm-year. Surprise is the standardized decile rank of forecast surprise, which is 
calculated as the management forecast minus the prevailing analyst consensus forecast, averaged 
across management forecasts for each firm-year. To reduce the influence of extreme values, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. P-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the industry (SIC 2 digit)-year level. The p-values are one-
sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise. 
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Table 7 Effect of SFAS 142 on the Speed of Earnings Announcements 
 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.
Post142 ?  -0.0914*** 0.000 
Post142 × Treatment  +  0.0574*** 0.005 
InstOwn +  0.0068 0.432 
AC +  0.0079*** 0.000 
RetVol -  0.7428 0.890 
NumSeg -  0.0046 0.882 
EqIss +  0.0132 0.147 
Log(AT) +  -0.0323 0.992 
MTB +  0.0019** 0.021 
ROA +  -0.0292 0.677 
Ret +  0.0105 0.107 
Loss -  -0.0128 0.225 
Leverage -  0.0105 0.603 
CF +  0.0272 0.320 
Firm Dummies   Included 
    
N   2,473 
Adjusted R2   0.7453 
 
Note: Table 7 reports the regression results of Speed of EA. The dependent variable, Speed of EA, is 
measured as (-1) times the natural logarithm of the average difference in days between the fiscal 
quarter-end and the quarterly earnings announcement (EA) date, across the quarters for a firm-year. 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. To reduce the influence of extreme values, all continuous 
variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. P-values are based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the industry (SIC 2 digit)-year level. The p-values are one-sided for 
variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise. 
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Table 8 Falsification Tests  
 
       (1)    (2)   (3) 
   Pseudo Treatment Sample 
 
Pseudo Treatment Sample 
(excluding firms with intangible  
with infinite lives or goodwill)  
Pseudo Event Sample 
  Pred.    Coef. p-val.    Coef. p-val.   Coef. p-val. 
Post142 ?  0.0011 0.858  -0.0088 0.272    
Post142 × Pseudo_Treatment  ?  0.0005 0.934  0.0011 0.904    
Pseudo_ Post142 ?        0.0075** 0.027 
Pseudo_Post142 × Treatment  ?        0.0007 0.834 
InstOwn +  -0.0093 0.852  -0.0327 0.954  0.0051 0.148 
AC +  0.0019*** 0.000  0.0029*** 0.008  0.0007*** 0.001 
RetVol -  -0.4454*** 0.006  -0.6301** 0.049  -0.2442*** 0.002 
NumSeg -  -0.0010 0.132  -0.0006 0.328  0.0012 0.998 
EqIss +  0.0044 0.172  0.0069 0.202  -0.0016 0.779 
Log(AT) +  0.0240*** 0.000  0.0540*** 0.000  0.0130*** 0.000 
MTB +  0.0016*** 0.000  0.0036*** 0.001  0.0008*** 0.000 
ROA +  0.0436** 0.014  0.0230 0.293  0.0340*** 0.005 
Ret +  -0.0157 1.000  -0.0113 0.977  -0.0107 1.000 
Loss -  -0.0109** 0.012  -0.0186** 0.021  -0.0109*** 0.000 
Leverage -  -0.0485*** 0.001  -0.0631** 0.027  -0.0074 0.155 
CF +  0.0049 0.394  0.0088 0.401  0.0150 0.117 
Horizon -  -0.0139** 0.024  -0.0032 0.402  -0.0050 0.145 
Firm Dummies   Included  Included Included 
     
N   2,003  650  4,304 
Adjusted R2   0.5331   0.5263   0.4766 
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Note: Table 8 reports the results from regressions of Forecast Accuracy. In Columns (1) and (2), Pseudo_Treatment equals one if the firm reports Other 
Intangibles throughout the six-year sample period and zero for pseudo control firms, which do not have any Other Intangibles throughout the six-year period. 
In Column (1), the sample includes 2,003 firm-years from the pseudo-treatment and pseudo-control sample that issued earnings forecast at least once in both 
the pre- and post-SFAS 142 periods. In Column (2), we exclude pseudo-treatment firms from the sample if they report either goodwill or other intangibles 
with infinite lives. In Column (3), the pseudo-adoption year is 2006; Pseudo_Post142 equals one for the years 2007 through 2009 and zero for the years 2003 
through 2005. The results are based on a sample of 4,304 firm-years from the treatment and control firms that issued earnings forecast at least once in both the 
pseudo pre- and post-SFAS 142 periods. Treatment (control) firms are the firms that have (do not have) goodwill from 2003 to 2009. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. To reduce the influence of extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. P-values are 
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the industry (SIC 2 digit)-year level. The p-values are one-sided for variables with predicted signs and two-
sided otherwise. 
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Table 9 Effect of SFAS 142 on Management Forecast Accuracy  
– Controlling for Impact of Contemporaneous Changes 
 
Panel A: Excluding Firms with Internal Control Material Weaknesses 
 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.
Post142 ?  -0.0062 0.264
Post142 × Treatment +  0.0163*** 0.001
Control Variables   Included 
Firm Dummies   Included 
    
N   2,076 
Adjusted R2   0.6304 
 
Panel B: Controlling for Changes in Board Independence 
 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.
Post142 ?  -0.0018 0.763
Post142 × Treatment +  0.0139*** 0.005
Post142× ∆BIND +  0.0346** 0.016
Control Variables   Included 
Firm Dummies   Included 
    
N   2,035 
Adjusted R2   0.6045 
 
Note: Table 9 reports the results from regressions of Forecast Accuracy. In Panel A, the regression is 
estimated after excluding firms that disclosed internal control material weaknesses under SOX 
Section 302 or 404. In Panel B, the regression is estimated after including Post142 × ∆BIND. ∆BIND 
is the change in the average proportion of independent directors on the board from the pre- to the 
post-SFAS 142 period. ∆BIND is not included in the regression because it is subsumed by the firm 
fixed effect. See Appendix A for variable definitions. To reduce the influence of extreme values, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. P-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the industry (SIC 2 digit)-year level. The p-values are one-
sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise. 
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Table 10 Effect of SFAS 142 on Investment Efficiency and Firm Performance 
 
Panel A: M&A Quality (AcqCAR(-1,+1)) 
 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.
Post142 ?  -0.0066 0.321
Post142 × Improvement  +  0.0109* 0.056
Tobin's q ?  -0.0075** 0.021
Log(MV) ?  -0.0026 0.721
Leverage ?  0.0194 0.489
ROA ?  0.0079 0.820
Numseg ?  0.0010 0.490
InstOwn ?  0.0026 0.904
RelSize +  0.0000 0.394
Public -  -0.0207*** 0.003
Domestic ?  -0.0055 0.381
Tender ?  0.0141 0.188
AllCash -  0.0007 0.556
AllStock -  0.0129 0.868
DiffInd -  -0.0051 0.185
Hostile -  0.0085 0.717
NumBidder -  -0.0190* 0.091
Firm Dummies   Included 
    
N   713 
Adjusted R2   0.0963 
 
Note: Table 10 reports the results of the analyses that examine the impact of SFAS 142 on investment 
efficiency and performance. Panel A of Table 10 reports the results from regressions of acquirers’ 
M&A announcement returns based on a sample of 713 M&A announcements of treatment firms that 
have at least one M&A announcement in both the pre- and post-SFAS 142 periods. The sample 
consists only of treatment firms because M&A transactions are rare for control firms. The dependent 
variable, AcqCAR(-1,+1), is the three-day cumulative market-adjusted return centered around the 
M&A announcement date. We use SDC Platinum Merger and Acquisition Database and select 
completed transactions identified as mergers, acquisitions of majority interest, and acquisition of 
assets made by US firms. To ensure the economic significance of the M&A transactions, we require 
the transaction value be greater than $1 million and its relative size (defined as the ratio of transaction 
value to the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market value of equity) be at least 1%.  Improvement equals 
one if the change in forecast accuracy from the pre- to the post-SFAS 142 period is above the median 
of treatment firms, and zero otherwise. Tobin's q, Log(MV), Leverage, ROA, NumSeg, and InstOwn 
are measured at the last fiscal-year-end prior to the M&A announcement. To reduce the influence of 
extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. P-
values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the industry (SIC 2 digit)-year level. The 
p-values are one-sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise. 
 
Variable definitions: 
Tobin's q = the sum of market value of equity, book value of preferred stock, and book value of 
debt, scaled by total assets. 
Log(MV) = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. 
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Leverage = long term debt plus debt in current liabilities, scaled by total assets. 
ROA = return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by the 
beginning-of-period total assets. 
NumSeg =  the number of business and geographic segments. 
InstOwn = institutional ownership, measured as the number of shares held by institutional 
investors as reported in Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings database 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Firms not covered by 13f 
institutions are assumed to have zero institutional ownership. 
RelSize = the relative size of the transaction, calculated as the deal’s transaction value scaled 
by the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market value of equity. 
Public = a dummy variable that equals one if the target is a public firm, and zero otherwise. 
Domestic = a dummy variable that equals one if the target is a US firm, and zero otherwise. 
Tender = a dummy variable that equals one if the transaction is classified as tender offer, and 
zero otherwise. 
AllCash = a dummy variable that equals one if the only consideration offered for the transaction 
is cash, earnout, or assumption of liabilities, or any combination of the three. 
AllStock = a dummy variable that equals one if the only consideration for the transaction is a 
form of stock. 
DiffInd = a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer’s two-digit primary SIC code is 
different from that of the target, and zero otherwise. 
Hostile = a dummy variable that equals one if the attitude of the target company's management 
or board of directors toward the transaction is hostile, and zero otherwise. 
NumBidder = the number of bidders for the same target. 
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Table 10 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Internal Capital Market Efficiency (ICM Efficiency) 
 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.
Post142 ? -0.1158** 0.027
Post142 × Treatment ? 0.0259 0.696
Post142 × Treatment × Improvement  + 0.1670*** 0.005
CAPX ? -2.0395** 0.041
Leverage ? 0.2112 0.399
Dividend ? 0.0992 0.265
Liquidity ? -0.2226 0.383
Log(AT) ? -0.1488** 0.015
MTB ? -0.0106 0.102
ROA ? -0.7658 0.117
Ret ? -0.0740 0.110
Loss ? -0.1128 0.189
NumSeg ? 0.0431** 0.013
Firm Dummies  Included 
   
N  628 
Adjusted R2  0.0916 
 
Note: Panel B of Table 10 reports the results from regressions of ICM Efficiency, a firm’s internal 
capital market efficiency. The analysis is based on a sample of 628 firm-years with ICM Efficiency 
measurable in both the pre- and post-SFAS 142 periods. ICM efficiency is the sum of ∆CAPX among 
operating units with higher future profitability minus the sum of ∆CAPX among operating units with 
lower future profitability, scaled by average total CAPX:  
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EfficiencyICM , 
where, ∆CAPXijt is the change in capital expenditures (CAPX) for operating unit j of firm i in year t, 
HFPijt (LFPijt) is an indicator variable for operating units with high (low) future profitability. An 
operating unit is regarded as having high (low) future profitability if its future profitability is higher 
(lower) than the median of future profitability across operating units of the firm, in which an operating 
unit’s future profitability is assumed to be the median value of the one-year-ahead ROA of single-
industry firms in the same industry. Note that an operating unit is defined based on the reported 
segments with the same four-digit SIC codes. For treatment firms, Improvement equals one if the 
change in forecast accuracy from the pre- to the post-SFAS 142 period is above the median of 
treatment firms, and zero otherwise. Improvement is zero for control firms. CAPX is capital 
expenditure scaled by total assets. Dividend is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm pays 
dividends in the year and zero otherwise. Liquidity is cash plus cash equivalents, scaled by total 
assets. See Appendix A for the definition of other variables. To reduce the influence of extreme 
values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles P-values are 
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the industry (SIC 2 digit)-year level. The p-values 
are one-sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise. 
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Table 10 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Firm Performance (ROA) 
 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.
Post142 ? 0.0137* 0.055 
Post142 × Treatment ? -0.0059 0.179 
Post142 × Treatment × Improvement  + 0.0099** 0.015 
Lagged ROA + 0.2803*** 0.001 
Firm Dummies  Included 
   
N  2,444 
Adjusted R2  0.4916 
 
Note: Panel C of Table 10 reports the results from regressions of ROA based on a sample of 2,444 
firm-years with ROA measurable in both the pre- and post-SFAS 142 periods. For treatment firms, 
Improvement equals one if the change in forecast accuracy from the pre- to the post-SFAS 142 period 
is above the median of treatment firms, and zero otherwise. Improvement is zero for control firms. To 
reduce the influence of extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-
ninth percentiles P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the industry (SIC 2 
digit)-year level. The p-values are one-sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
